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Diplomacy  is  always  a  tedious  and  trying  endeavor.  It  is  not  so
hopeless,  however,  that  countless  diplomatists  of  modern  history,
supported  by  far  less  power  and  intelligence  than  the  United  States
possesses,  have  not arranged  matters of profound  significance  through
the  simple  application  of  reasoned  judgment  to  international  affairs.
Yet  without  that  freedom  of  choice,  unencumbered  by  ideological
preferences,  which  Washington  advocated  in  his  Farewell  Address,
there can be no genuine  diplomacy.  Whether  the  absence  of flexibility
in  United  States  policy  flows  from  political  pressures,  illusions  of
omnipotence,  the  national  weakness  for  abstractions,  the  defense  of
prestige,  or  the  sheer  inertia  of  government  matters  little.  Each  of
these factors succeeds only in reinforcing  the others.
Within  the  context  of  an  overdemanding  national  environment,
can  the  United  States  mark  off  a  series  of  diplomatic  positions  that
best  reflect the nation's  long-range  interests?
DIPLOMACY  AND  EXERCISE  OF  POWER
The major  achievements  of  American  foreign  policy  since  1945
-those  which  overshadow  all  others-have  been  the  economic  re-
habilitation  of  Western  Europe  and  Japan,  and  the  maintenance
of a military  structure,  largely  through NATO,  capable  of guarantee-
ing the  lines of demarcation  in a divided  Europe.
These  accomplishments,  remarkable  and  unprecedented  as  they
are, have been limited to what the economic  and military power  of the
United  States  will  buy.  Unfortunately  it  is  true  that  for  the  indus-
trially dominant  United  States  the  creation  and  employment  of force
has  often  been  its easiest  and  its major  contribution  to  world  affairs.
American  power  in  this  century  has  contributed  to  victory  in  two
world  wars  and  has  stabilized  a  cold  war.  But  power  even  of  such
magnitude  will not do everything.  On record,  in fact,  its employment
in winning rather than preventing wars has brought few genuine  gains.
That  power,  unfortunately,  contributed  to  the  destruction  of  the
old  European  balance  of  power  which  gave  this  nation  its  profound
security  before  1914.  The  stability  of Europe,  and  with  it  America's
favored  position,  required  above all  a balance  between  Germany  and
Russia.  It  could  not  survive  a total  victory  of  one  over  the other.
5Nationalism  and  communism-the  twin  enemies  of  liberal  tradi-
tions of  the Western  World-were  unleashed  on  the  world  by World
War  I  and  received  their  second  massive  impetus  from  the  second
World  War.  Both  of  these  movements  demand  that  culture  imple-
ment  politics;  both  require  undivided  loyalty  of  their  followers.  In
Latin America,  Africa,  and Asia the  great  challenge  to tolerance  and
diversity  comes from both nationalism  and communism,  perhaps more
from  the  former  than  the  latter.  Nationalism  lies  closer  to  the  basic
human  emotions  and  is  easier  to  spread.  Wherever  communism  ap-
pears  to  be  dominant,  much  of  its  dominance  rests  upon  its  past
exploitation  of  nationalism,  and  if  it  spreads  elsewhere,  it  will  be
not  because  of  its  inherent  merits  but  because  of  the  strength  that
it may  receive  from  nationalistic  propaganda.
Thus,  in  the  postwar  world  even  its  great  power  has  not  per-
mitted  the  United  States  to  resolve  any  of  its  controversies  with  its
major  antagonists-Russia  and  China-through  the  normal  devices
of diplomacy.  NATO  has  not  eliminated  Soviet power  and  influence
from  Eastern  Europe.  Nor  has  American  power  and  the  American
alliance  system  in  the  Pacific  disposed  of  the  Peiping  regime  or
brought  peace  to  Asia  or  Africa.  This  appears  doubly  strange  inas-
much  as  American  diplomatists  enjoy  the  backing  of  a  universally
recognized  national  capacity  to  pulverize  much  of  the  earth's  sur-
face  within  a  matter  of  hours.  Unfortunately,  from  the  viewpoint  of
the  Western  World,  the  USSR  and  China  have  also  experienced
a vast internal growth and the  accumulation of such power  and energy
that  the  total  Western  effort  has  achieved  a  military  and  political
stalemate  rather than  victory or even  a settlenent.
In  the  Far  East  especially  the  search  for  stability  has  proven
to  be  agonizingly  futile.  Despite  enormous  effort,  the  United  States
has  not  succeeded  in  eliminating  revolution,  political  turmoil,  sub-
version,  guerilla warfare,  and all  the other enemies of peaceful  change
and  self-determination.  The  limits  of  power  appear  especially  evident
in  South  Viet  Nam  where  the  United  States  has  demonstrated  again
its power  to destroy  on  a  massive  scale.  Whether  that  destruction  is
achieving  political  stability,  however,  is  doubtful.  As  the  usually  per-
ceptive  James Reston  wrote  from  Saigon  late  in  August:
We  are  chasing  guerrillas  with  bombs  and  it  is  apparently  having
much  more  effect  on  the Viet  Cong than  anybody  thought  possible,  but
in  the process  we  are  attacking  and often  destroying  the areas  we want
to  pacify.  It  is  now  estimated  that  there  are  between  500,000  and
600,000  refugees  in  this  country.  Most  of  them  are  living  in  shacks
and  pens  that  would  make  the  slums  of  Harlem  look  like  the  LBJ
Ranch.  . . . This  country  normally  produces  a  rice  surplus,  but  this
year  the  U.  S.  has  already  had  to  commit  itself  to  bring  in  100,000
6tons  of  rice  to  make  up  for  the  lost  production  of  peasants  driven
off  the  land  ....
But  above  all  the  people  of  Viet  Nam  are  trapped  in  a  power
struggle  beyond  their  understanding  or  control.  Maybe  nothing can  be
done  about  it,  but  somewhere  in  a  corner  of  the  mind  their  tragedy
must  be  remembered.  For  we  could  win  the  war  and  lose  the  people,
and  that  would  be  the  final  irony  of  the  story.
American  power  has  brought  stability  outside  Europe  only  to
the  region  of  the  Caribbean  where  United  States  influence  is  com-
pletely  dominant  and  where  it holds the  absolute  strategic  advantage
over  any  nation  of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere  which  might  choose  to
contest  American  purpose.  This  strategic  advantage  decreed  the
ultimate  success  of  President  John  F.  Kennedy  in  his  confrontation
with  Nikita  Khrushchev  over  the  Cuban  missile  bases  in  October
1962.  Yet the  continued existence  of the  Castro  government  in Cuba
illustrates  again  the  limits  of United  States  power  to  control  political
events  in  a  region  only  ninety  miles  from  American  shores.  The
United  States  intervened  in  the  Caribbean  states  on twenty  occasions
between  1898  and  1920.  By  1930,  however,  it  was  clear  that  this
policy  had  brought  little  political  stability.  Again  in  1965  the
United States, without fear of retaliation,  landed troops in  the Domin-
ican Republic  to protect  its citizens  and  to prevent  a  possible  Com-
munist  coup.  There,  too,  it  quickly  became  evident  that  the  United
States  could  not  bring  political  salvation  beyond  the  capacity  and
determination  of  the  country's  leaders  to  seek  their  own  political
solutions.
Power  is  of  supreme  importance  in  world  affairs.  It  is  a  pre-
requisite  for  world  leadership  and  for  the  defense  of  one's  interests
and  security  from  open  attack.  That  it  has  played  an  essential  role
in  bringing  security  and  even  prosperity  to  the  United  States  and
Western  Europe  is  beyond  question.  But  that  power,  in  short,  has
not  permitted  the  United  States  to control  events  that  lie  outside  its
clearly  recognized  sphere  of influence.
Through  the  logic  of  history  and  geography  the  United  States
has  written  into  the  record  its  vital  concern  for  what  happens  in
Europe  and  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  However,  the world  simply
does  not  recognize  any  body  of  established  American  interests  in
Asia.  Countless  students  and  leaders  within  the  nations  of  Europe,
Africa,  and Asia  who  would  not  question  the  United  States  commit-
ments  to  Europe  and  the  Caribbean  would  deny  that  this  nation
possesses  any  interests  in  Asia  significant  enough  to  merit  a  general
war  in their defense.  In the  turmoil of Asia  it  is  not easy  to discover
the  relationship  between  the  price  of  destruction  and  the  gain  to be
derived.
7Why  the  gains  from  sheer  destruction  are  always  illusive  is
clear  enough.  The  power  to destroy  is  not  the  power  to  control.  At
the  level  of war  the  United  States  could  kill  hundreds  of  millions  of
Asians in one day; at the level of politics it cannot govern  the game  of
musical  chairs  in  Saigon  even  though  the  South  Vietnamese  regime
could  not exist one  month without the full economic,  political,  moral,
and  military  support  of the  United  States.  With  all  of  its  power  the
United  States  cannot  control  one  square  foot  of territory  beyond  its
legal  jurisdiction  unless  it  chooses  to  engage  in  actual  conquest.  At
Seattle  in  November  1961,  President  Kennedy  reminded  the Ameri-
can  people  that  there  were  few  decisions  in  world  politics  which  this
nation could  determine:
...  we  must  face  problems  [he  said |  that  do  not  lend  themselves
to  easy,  quick  or  permanent  solutions.  And  we  must  face  the  fact
that the United  States  is  never  omnipotent nor  omniscient,  that  we  can-
not  always  impose  our  will  on  the  other 94  per  cent  of  mankind,  that
we  cannot  right  every  wrong  or  reverse  each  adversity,  and  that  there-
fore  there  cannot  be  an  American  solution  for  every  world  problem.
THREE  STREAMS  OF  AMERICAN  THOUGHT
Fortunately  the  unfinished  business  of  postwar  diplomacy  has
not  challenged  the  basic  interests  of  the  United  States.  But  if  the
limits  of  what  the  existence  of  vast  economic  and  destructive
power  will  achieve  have  been  reached  on  most  diplomatic  fronts,
then  all  unfinished  business  must  remain  unfinished  or  be  resolved
through  the  methods  of diplomacy  and  compromise.  The  problem  is
not  alone  that  of  terminating  the  cold  war;  it  is  more  that  of  re-
ducing  those  tendencies  toward  internationtal  anarchy  in which  even
the  most  well-meaning  nations,  acting  in  unison,  might  lose  control
of events.  The  chief task  confronting the  United  States-one that  has
always  fallen  to  the  status quo powers  of  the  world-is  that  of  en-
couraging  the  dissatisfied  nations to refrain  from  aggression  by  main-
taining  that fine  balance  between  sufficient  power  and  sufficient  flexi-
bility  which  alone  can  produce  a  world  of  adequate  security  with  a
minimum  of friction  and  conflict.  It is  this  elusive balance  which  the
United  States  and the Western  World  are  seeking  that offers  the  pros-
pect of  an  improving  future.
What  disturbs  the student  of  American  foreign  policy,  however,
is  the  clear  dichotomy  between  the  ubiquitous  recognition  of  the
nation's  limited  power  by  Washington  officials  and  the  actual  de-
mands  placed  on  American  policy  in  much  of  the  world.  At  the
heart  of  the  dilemma  is  the  relationship  between  government  and  a
popular  foreign  policy.  Too  often  politicians  in  search  of  public  ap-
probation  draw the American  people into questions purely  diplomatic
8-questions  whose  settlement  can  have  no  relationship  to American
opinion.  Few governments  since the  eighteenth  century  have ventured
far into  foreign  involvements  without endeavoring  to carry  the  senti-
ment  of  their  countries  with  them.  What  matters,  therefore,  is  not
public  opinion  as  a factor  in policy  creation,  but what  a people  have
been led to expect  of their foreign policies  and  whether their expecta-
tions  will  permit  a  national  leadership  the  liberty  of  formulating  ob-
jectives  abroad  that  have  some  relationship  to both  the nation's  his-
toric  interests  as well as  its limited  power. It is  in this respect that the
internal  pressures  on  American  leadership  have  been  disturbing  and
unique.
Perhaps  the reason  is  clear.  Those  editors,  writers,  or  politicians
who  choose  to  extract  partisan  advantage  from  foreign  policy  ques-
tions  invariably  seize  the  most  demanding  of  alternatives  and  insist
that the government  pursue  them.  Such maneuvering  can be explained
by  the  existence  of  three  streams  in  American  thought:  the  illusion
of omnipotence,  the  spirit of  nationalism,  and  the  inclination  of  the
nation's  minorities  to identify  any  acceptable  foreign  policy  with  the
welfare of the countries of their origin.
Nation's  Omnipotence
The  belief  in  the  nation's  omnipotence  flows  logically  from  a
record  of  astonishing  success  that  began  in  the  eighteenth  century.
If the  young  republic  of  Franklin,  Washington,  and  Jefferson  man-
aged  to  defend  its  interests  in  every  diplomatic  confrontation  even
with  the great  powers of Europe,  then  certainly  the leading  nation  of
the  twentieth  century  should  continue  to  do  so.
Even  more  troublesome,  and  lying  at  the  base  of  the  American
isolationist  tradition,  is  the  deep-seated  conviction  that  the  omnipo-
tence  of the  United  States  relies  less  on  the  nation's  physical  power,
always  a  limited  entity,  than  on  the  peculiar  qualities  of  American
civilization  which  appeared  predominant  at  the  turn  of  the  century
when  the  United  States  enjoyed  both  international  primacy  and
almost  absolute  security  at  a minimum  of  physical  and  financial  ef-
fort.  Unmindful  of  the  unique  role  played  by  the  nation's  genuine
insulation  from  world  politics,  its  industrial  capacity,  the  British
navy, and the European  balance of power in  creating  its favored posi-
tion,  countless  Americans,  conscious  only  of the  strange  relationship
between  the  nation's  security  and  its  minimum  defense  expenditures,
have  found  the  country's  strength  in  low  taxes,  its  free  enterprise
system,  and  the  moral  promise  of  its  democratic  structure.  This  ex-
plains  why  those  who  demand  the  triumph  of  American  purpose
9abroad  invariably  demand  a  simultaneous  reduction  of  the  federal
tax  burden.
American  Nationalism
The  nation's  patriotic  sentiments  are  as  vulnerable  to  exploita-
tion by foreign policy elites  as  is  the notion  of United  States  omnipo-
tence.  Yet  the  appeals  to  American  nationalism  have  followed  no
consistent  pattern,  for  their  character  reflects  the  peculiar  require-
ments of the times.  After the armistice  of  1918 American  nationalism
expressed  itself  in  a total  repudiation  of  all  foreign  policy  influences
which  might  tarnish  the  brightness  of  American  institutions  or  in-
volve  the  country  unnecessarily  in  world  affairs.  The  nationalists  of
the twenties,  taking up the  cause of the  Irish-Americans,  the German-
Americans,  and  other  minority  groups  who  were  disappointed  with
Wilson's  efforts  at  Versailles  in  behalf  of  self-determination,  turned
their abuse  on Britain  and  the Allies.
Since  World  War  II  the  basic  appeal  to  American  patriotism
has  logically  taken  the  form  of  anti-communism,  for  to most  Ameri-
cans  communism  poses  the  ultimate  challenge  to  American  security,
ideals,  and  institutions.  The  historic  concept  of  mission,  assigning
to  the  United  States  the  special  obligation  to secure  the  eventual  tri-
umph  of  universal freedom,  simply  reinforces  the  nation's  anti-Soviet
and  anti-Chinese  posture  by  insisting  that  any  American  policies
abroad,  worthy  of  the  nation's  ideals,  must  pursue  the  Wilsonian
principle  of  self-determination  to  the  elimination  of  all  governments
under  Communist  control.  Goals  based  on  such  abstractions  as  self-
determination  of  people  may  be  attractive  enough  in  public  state-
ments  but,  unfortunately,  they  have  little  meaning  in  diplomacy  for
the  simple  reason  that  they  create  purposes  which  transcend  the  na-
tion's interests  and,  in  practice,  demand  that  others forfeit  their  posi-
tions,  not  on  the  basis  of their  inferior  power,  efficiency,  or  interest,
but on the basis  of their inferior  moral and legal claims.  This accounts
for the  fact that  abstract objectives  generally  remain  dead issues at all
levels  of policy formulation except  that of rhetoric.
Uncompromising  Opposition  to  Communist  Bloc
The perennial  demand  that the United  States  maintain its  uncom-
promising  opposition  toward  the  Communist  bloc  has  established  a
direct  relationship  between  the nation's declared  objectives  in Europe
and the will of powerful  urban minorities  of Eastern European  extrac-
tion.  The  impact of these  groups  on United  States  wartime  diplomacy
is  obvious  enough  from  President  Roosevelt's  recorded  conversations
with  Stalin  at  both  Teheran  and  Yalta.  What  gave  special  force  to
10the  country's  uncompromising  mood  during  the  immediate  postwar
years, when the Grand  Alliance  finally  disintegrated,  was  the  decision
of the Catholic  Church  to adopt  not only  the  new American  nation-
alism  but  also  the  cause  of  its  constituent  minorities  from  Eastern
Europe.  "The  church,"  D.  F.  Fleming  has  written,  "was  the  fixed
rock on  which  every  cold  warrior  could  rely."
John  Foster  Dulles'  program  of  liberation  continued  this  spe-
cial  appeal  to  the  nation's  Slavic  minorities.  Like  similar  causes  in
American  history,  such  as  the  Young  America  movement  of  1852,
liberation  was  designed  less  to  free  Hungarians  and  Poles  than  to
capture the political allegiance  of Eastern European  groups within the
United  States.  Indeed,  during  the  1952  presidential  campaign  Adlai
Stevenson  termed  liberation  "a  cynical  and  transparent  attempt,
drenched  in  crocodile  tears,  to  play  upon  the  anxieties  of  foreign
nationality groups in this country."  Yet as late  as October  1960, Vice
President Richard Nixon,  in his  closing appeal  to the  voters  of Amer-
ica,  promised  that  with  his  election  he  would  dispatch  three  former
Presidents  of  the  United  States-Herbert  Hoover,  Harry  Truman,
and  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower-to  Eastern  Europe  to  arrange  for  that
region's liberation.
Unfortunately  any  successful  appeals  to  American  utopianism,
nationalism,  and  hyphenism  identify  the  most  extreme  demands  on
the  enemy  of  the  moment  with  patriotism.  The  more  successful  the
appeal,  the  more  its  proponents  saddle  the  nation  with  a  diplomatic
burden.  When  completely  successful  they  force  national  behavior
into  a  state of  limbo wherein  it  can never  settle  its  external  conflicts
with  negotiation.  Nor  can  it  legitimately  resolve  them  through  war,
for  by  common  consent  objectives  so  established  transcend  the  na-
tion's  interests.  In  actual  practice  it  means  that  the  country  is  en-
couraged  to  cling  to  a  variety  of  goals  that  can  be  achieved  only
through war while at the  same time it abjures  the use of force  in their
pursuit.  The  result can  only be diplomatic  deadlock.
Two  classic  examples  of  this  self-imposed  dilemma  of  pursuing
peacefully  what  can  be accomplished  only through  war  can  be  found
in  the  United  States-Japanese  quarrel  over  China  and  the  United
States-Soviet  conflict  over  Eastern Europe.  More  recently  the  United
States  has  become  involved  in  a  similar  confrontation  with  China
over  the  future  of  Southeast  Asia.  What  has  determined  the  nation's
course in each conflict  has been a variety of domestic  pressures  which
have  created  the  conviction  that  the  United  States  possessed  the
power  to  direct  and control  the manifold  changes  on the world  scene
without  resort  to  war.  A recent  journal  editorial  summarized  the  re-
sulting dilemma  for American leadership  in  the following  terms:
11There  is  ...  a  crisis  in  leadership  but  it  does  not  come  from  the
failure  to guide  world  events  along  our  favorite  paths.  Rather  does  this
crisis arise  from the  fact that  our leadership  has  allowed  the  impression
of  U.  S.  omnipotence  to  be  engraved  into  a  basic  dogma  of  Ameri-
canism.  It has  been said  that  to be  aware of one's ignorance  is  the  first
step  towards  wisdom.  Effective  leadership  begins  when  it  is  realized
that  there  are  limits  to  America's  capabilities  in  the  real  world  of  the
1960's.  Leadership  will  then  be  in  the  position  to  devise  bold  and
imaginative  programs  to cope  with  a  world  convulsed  by  kaleidoscopic
changes.
BARRIERS  TO  NEGOTIATIONS
Overexaggeration  of  Danger
What  compounds  the  problem  of  inflexibility  and  overdemand-
ing  is  the  American  habit  of  regarding  all  its  enemies  as  insatiable.
Perhaps  the  Tanaka  Memorial,  followed  in  the  late  thirties  by  the
announcement  of  its  "Co-prosperity  Sphere"  in  the  Orient,  gave
Japan  the  appearance  of  a nation  bent  on  the  total conquest  of East
and  Southeast  Asia.  Yet  there  was  little  relationship  between  such
alleged universal  goals and the  actual proposals  embodied in  Japanese
diplomacy  during  the weeks  preceding  Pearl  Harbor.  The  acceptance
of limitless ambitions  in  an enemy  discourages  diplomacy  both  by re-
ducing all negotiation  to the level of appeasement  and by encouraging
the  establishment  of  a  countering  purpose  to  seek  that  country's
destruction  as  a  matter  of self-defense.
United  States  inflexibility  toward  Russia  and  China  partakes  of
extreme  assumptions  regarding  the  danger  which  they  pose.  Perhaps
no  one  has  defined  the  Soviet  challenge  to  American  security  and
values  in  more  universal  terms  than  has  Bertram  D.  Wolfe.  One  of
his  warnings  regarding  the  Soviet  Union,  published  in  the  January
1959  issue of  The New Leader, ran  as  follows:
It  is  a  deadly  enemy.  It  is  a  deadly  enemy  because  never  for  a
moment  does  it  abandon  its  two  basic  aims:  to  remake  man,  and
to conquer  the  world.  It  is  particularly  our enemy-not  because  we  so
choose,  but because  it has  chosen.  It  regards  the  strength  and  the  way
of  life  of  the  United  States  as  the  chief  obstacle  to  its  plan  to  remake
its  own  people  and  to  remake  the  world  in  the  image  of  its  blueprint.
Any  definition  of  the  Soviet  problem  in  such  terms  dictates  au-
tomatically  a  posture  of  limitless  opposition,  for  any  compromise
with  an insatiable  enemy  can  lead  only  to  retreat  and  ultimate  col-
lapse.  Confronted  with  the  extreme  choice  of  total  victory  or  total
ruin,  the  United  States,  declares  the  argument,  must  pursue  victory.
"Anything  less  than  victory,  in  the  long  run,"  Barry  Goldwater
warned  the  Senate  in  July  1961,  "can  only  be  defeat,  degradation,
and  slavery."  Defining  the  Chinese  threat  to Asia  in  the  language  of
12universal  ambition,  Karl Lott  Rankin,  chief United  States  representa-
tive to the  Republic  of China  from  1950  until  1958,  wrote  the  State
Department  in April  1957:
A  great  people  like  the  Chinese  will  never  accept  the  permanent
mutilation  of  their  country.  This  only  reinforces  the  conclusion  that
there  can  be  no  genuine  lasting  peace  in  Asia  while  half  a  billion
Chinese  remain  under  communist  rule.  Peace  will  remain  in  jeopardy
and  freedom  a  word  of  mockery  until  a  reunited  China  joins  the  free
world.  Lenin  said  that  the  road  to  Paris  lay  through  Peiping.  In  any
case,  China  is  half  of  Asia  and  Asia  is  half  the  world.  The  fate  of
China  may  well  determine  the  fate  of  all.
For  eleven  years  the  United  States  rationale  for  involvement
in  South  Viet  Nam  has  been  based  on  the  domino  theory  that  the
enemy,  never  defined  in  terms  more  concrete  than  Communist  ag-
gression,  is  insatiable  and  if  permitted  any  further  successes  will
drive  Western  influence  and  power  completely  out  of  Asia  and  the
Pacific. No American  leader has stated this  idea  more  often  and with
greater  vehemence  than has  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  twice United  States
ambassador  to  Saigon.  Lodge  wrote  in  the  New  York  Times  Maga-
zine of  January  17,  1965:
Geographically,  Vietnam  stands  at  the  hub  of  a  vast  area  of  the
world-Southeast  Asia-an  area  with  a  population  of  240  million
people  extending  2,300  miles  from  north  to  south,  and  3,000  miles
from  east  to  west.  The  Mekong  River,  one  of  the  ten  largest  rivers  in
the  world,  reaches  the  sea  in  South  Vietnam.  He  who  holds  or  has
influence  in  Vietnam  can  affect  the  future  of  the  Philippines  and
Taiwan  to the  east, Thailand  and  Burma  with  their  huge  rice  surpluses
to  the  west,  and  Malaysia  and  Indonesia  with  their  rubber,  oil  and
tin  to  the  south.  Japan,  Australia  and  New  Zealand  would  in  turn  be
deeply  concerned  by  the  Communization  of  South  Vietnam.
Similarly  General  Earle  G.  Wheeler,  chairman  of  the  Joint
Chiefs  of  Staff,  declared  in  August  1965  that  defeat  in  Viet  Nam
would  only  lead  to  the  need  of  defending  another  line  somewhere
in  Southeast  Asia.
Unfortunately,  the  United  States  is  never  permitted  to  formu-
late  actual  policies  that  reflect  the  challenge  as  defined,  and  this
failure,  in  large  measure,  destroys  the  seriousness  of  the  definition
itself.  No  Washington  official  has  yet  devised  a  policy  which  would
liberate  Eastern  Europe  or  destroy  the  Peiping  regime,  for  neither
objective  could  be  achieved  short  of  World  War  III.  Yet  both  of
these  objectives  have been embedded  in  American  rhetoric.
The  day-to-day  policies  of  the  United  States  vis-a-vis  Russia
and China have sought  coexistence,  not victory,  for the  simple  reason
that American  interests  will permit  no  less  and  American  power  will
13permit no more.  The  war  in  Viet Nam illustrates  also  the typical  gap
between  the  declared  ends  of  policy-the  defense  of  all  Southeast
Asia  and  the  entire  Pacific-and  the  established  means  of  policy.
To  prevent  this  general  Communist  conquest  the  United  States,
with  its  allies,  is  engaged  in  the  dual  action  of  fighting  the  Viet
Cong  in  the  jungles  of  South  Viet  Nam  and  bombing  a  variety  of
military  and  nonmilitary  bases  in  North  Viet  Nam.  Yet  what  is
the  precise  relationship  between  such  limited  action  and  the  ends
of  saving  all  Southeast  Asia  and  more?  If  the  threat  to  the  Asian
and  Pacific  world  is  total,  then  that  danger  cannot  emanate  from
either  the  Viet  Cong  or  Hanoi,  for  no  one  would  insist  that  these
jungle  areas  can  generate  more  than  very limited  power.  The  enemy,
as  defined  by the domino theory,  must be  China or, more  reasonably,
China  and  Russia  combined,  although  even  then  it  is  not  clear  how
any  enemy,  merely  through  capturing  Saigon,  can  command  the
sea  power  required  to conquer  the  entire  world  of  the  Pacific.
If China  and  Russia  are  the  enemy  in Asia,  how  can  the United
States  dispose  of  the  problem  of  conquest  with  its  present  course?
The  perennial  effort  to  resolve  the  struggle  with  limited war  indicates
that  the  nation's  leadership  does  not,  after  all,  regard  the  domino
theory  as  valid.  If Saigon,  moreover,  is  the  key  to the  defense  of  the
status quo in  a  vast  region of the  world,  then  it must  also  be  the  key
to  Communist  success  everywhere  in  Asia.  If this  is  true,  then  what
kind of effort  must eventually  be  required  to hold  that  city?
The  dilemma  created  by  the  overexaggeration  of  danger  and
the  resultant  downgrading  of  diplomacy  is  illustrated  clearly  by  the
gradual  acceleration  of  the  Vietnamese  war.  United  States  leader-
ship  has  made  it  definite  on  numerous  occasions  that  it  desires  no
war  in  South  Viet  Nam.  "Let  us  be  quite  clear  about  this,"  Adlai
Stevenson  wrote in  the  August  24 issue  of  Look.  "The  United States
has  no desire  to  dominate.  We  have  no  illusions  of  omnipotence  or
omniscience.  . . . We  do  not  see  ourselves  as  self-appointed  gen-
darmes  of  this  very  troubled  world.  And  we  do  not  want  to  rely  on
muscle  instead  of  diplomacy."  The  President  has  declared  that  he
has  no  desire  "to  expand  the  war."  When  in  July  he  announced  his
decision  to increase  the  American  troop  commitment  to  125,000  he
added,  "We  do  not  want  an  expanding  struggle  with  consequences
that  no  one  can  perceive."  During  the  campaign  of  1964  the  Presi-
dent  declared  repeatedly  that  he  opposed  going  north  and  thus  esca-
lating  the  war.  Yet  beginning  in  February  1965,  United  States  air-
craft  flew  north  and  began  bombing  targets  that  have  become
decreasingly  military  in  nature  and  increasingly  closer  to  Hanoi  and
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avoid  a  land  war  in  Asia.  Nothing,  he  has  said,  would  be  more
disastrous  than  to  pit American  soldiers  against  the  700  million  peo-
ple  of  China.  Despite  all  of  these  statements,  uttered  with  obvious
sincerity,  the United  States is  involved  in an expanding ground war  in
Asia.
Nor  is  this  necessarily  the  end.  The  growing  commitment  to
war,  as  long  as  it  produces  something  less  than  victory,  will  tend
to  generate  new  and  powerful  emotional,  political,  and  military  de-
mands  that  the  United  States  adopt  any  course  of  action  that  will
win  the  war.  Within  the  United  States  there  is  a  vast  conflict  of
opinion,  but  as  Loudon  Wainwright  wrote  in  the  July  23  issue  of
Life,  there  is  a growing  clamor  for  a  "strategy  of  clobber.  If  things
are  going  so badly,  goes  this  strategy,  why  in  God's  name  don't  we
just  go  in  there  and  blast  'em  where  it  hurts?"  The  nature  of  the
blast  and  the  delivery  point,  observes  Wainwright,  varies  from  one
clobberer  to another, but their  impatience,  he  fears,  will  mount.
This  discrepancy  between  intent  and  action  in  South  Viet  Nam
flows  naturally  from  the  failure in Washington  to establish  objectives
in  that  region  which  reflect  the  desire  to  avoid  an  escalating  war.
Wars  bring  an  enemy  to  the  conference  table  only  at  that  point
where  the  goals  pursued  are  limited enough  to  encourage  the  limita-
tion of war.  The objectives,  not the  weapons  used,  determine  whether
a war  will  remain  limited  or  not.  Some  possible  objectives,  adopted
earlier,  might have  terminated  the war  long  ago; other  goals,  if pur-
sued,  might  prove  to  be  elusive  no  matter  what  the  magnitude  of
the war  and the victory.  Wars,  for  example,  seldom  produce  any last-
ing  triumphs  for  abstractions.  The  goals  of  war,  like  the  goals  of
peace,  must  be  defined  in terms  precise  and  limited  enough  to  per-
mit their resolution  through normal diplomatic processes.
Herein  lies  the  rub.  In  lieu  of  victory  or  negotiation  those
who have  favored  the limited  escalation of the  war in Viet Nam  have
explained  this  necessity  with  a  wide  variety  of arguments  that under-
write  the  concept  of  the  domino:  the  need  to  fulfill  the  American
commitment  to  the  Vietnamese  people,  to  end  the  terrorism  of  the
Viet  Cong,  to  prevent  another  Munich,  to  terminate  Communist-
inspired  wars  of  liberation,  to  punish  the  aggressors,  to  strengthen
the  principle  of  collective  security,  to  assure  the  self-determination
of peoples.  Unfortunately,  only  in the  vaguest  sense  do  any  of these
purposes  suggest  any  specific  interest  of  the United  States.  They  in-
volve  only  words  and  ideas;  they  cannot  be  touched  or  found  on  a
map.  They tend  to be  universal  rather than  precise.  They  can be  ap-
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a  sense  of obligation  to  others.  But  diplomacy  must  deal  with  specif-
ics.  Even  military  action,  when  combined  with  intangible  goals,  has
generally  resulted  far  more  in  destruction  than  in  measurable  ac-
complishment.
Perhaps  no  American  has  stressed  more  forcefully  the  destruc-
tive  effect  of overestimating  the  enemy on the  processes  of diplomacy
than has George  F. Kennan.  Kennan repeated  this  theme in February
1965:
History  reveals  that  the  penalties  for  over-cynicism  in  the  estima-
tion  of  the  motives  of  others can  be  no  smaller,  on  occasions,  than  the
penalties  for naivety.  In  the  case  at  hand,  I suspect  they  may  be  even
greater.  For  in  the  prediction  of  only  the  worst  motives  on  the
adversary's  part  there  lies,  today,  no  hope  at  all:  only  a  continued
exacerbation  of  mutual  tensions  and  the  indefinite  proliferation  of
nuclear  weaponry.
Our  sole  hope  lies  in  the  possibility  that  the  adversary,  too,  has
learned  something  from  the  sterility  of  past  conflict;  that  he,  too,
sees-if only  through  the  dim  lens  of  ideological  prejudice,  suspicion
and accumulated  resentment-the  identity  of  fate that binds  us  all; that
some  reliance  can  be  placed,  in  the  adjustment  of  mutual  differences,
on  his  readiness  to  abstain,  voluntarily  and  in  self-interest,  from  the
wildest  and  most  senseless  acts  of  physical  destruction.
Prestige
A  further  barrier  to  negotiation  is  prestige.  Because  this  is
true,  national  leadership  should  weigh  carefully  the  ultimate  price
of any commitment  before it is declared.  Every resistance  to the modi-
fication  of  any  hard  line  toward  China  has  been  defended  at  least
partially  in terms  of protecting  the nation's  prestige,  especially  among
its  Asian  allies.  Prestige  is  important,  but not  as  important  as  other
considerations  of  a  more  concrete  nature,  such  as  the  avoidance  of
conflict  where  the  nation's  interests  are  not  involved.  The  sustain-
ing  of any  commitment  demands  a price,  and  if prestige  is  the  essen-
tial factor  in  resisting  change  the  price can  easily  transcend  the  gain.
"What  is  prestige?"  asked  Kennedy  after  the  Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco  in
1961.  "Is it  the shadow  of power  or  the  substance  of  power?  We  are
going to  work  on  the  substance  of power."
Prestige  does  not  hinge  on  clinging  to  commitments  when  al-
tered  conditions  have  demonstrated  that  the  means  required  to  pro-
tect  them  render  them  quite  untenable.  Prestige  reflects  rather  a  na-
tion's  ability  to  judge  its  interests  and  to  formulate  its  policies  on
that  judgment.  Britain  did  not  lose  prestige  in  Europe  by  giving  in-
dependence  to  her  colonies  in  America.  The  United  States  gave  up
16no prestige  in  agreeing  to  the Oregon  compromise  of  1846.  Nor did
France  suffer  a  loss  of  prestige  when  she  gave  independence  to  Al-
geria.  In  an  age  of nuclear  stalemate  the  United States  can build  its
prestige  more  effectively  and lastingly  with policies  that  lead to peace
than with those  which run  the risk  of  war.
Momentum in Government
The  last  of  the  important  factors  that  tend  to  produce  inflexi-
bility  in  foreign  policy  is  momentum  in  government.  Under  modern
conditions  any policy,  once  established,  becomes  excessively  demand-
ing  in  terms  of money  and  manpower.  Hundreds  if  not thousands  of
individuals  may  eventually  come  to  identify  their  personal  position
in  government  with  the  perpetuation  of  an  established  policy.  Na-
tional  leaders,  moreover,  generally  cherish  the  attribute  of  consist-
ency.  Even  when  policies  falter,  governments  often attach  the great-
est  importance  to  convincing  themselves  and  their  people  that  the
policies  should  remain  unchanged.  "Too  commonly,"  Gunnar  Myr-
dal,  the  noted European  economist,  declared  at  Washington  Univer-
sity,  St.  Louis, in April  1965,  "no other lessons  are drawn  other than
the  pretended  one:  that  experience  shows  that  these  policies  are
right and  have been  right from the  beginning.  This  is  a main  reason
why  failures  of  policy  become  catastrophic."  Amid  the  turmoil  in
Saigon  during  the  autumn  of  1963  President  Kennedy  admitted  that
the  Vietnamese  policies  of  the  United  States  had  not  succeeded;
nevertheless,  he said,  they would  not  be  changed.  President  Johnson,
when  under  pressure  to alter those  same policies  in  1965,  insisted  re-
peatedly  that  he  was  merely  carrying  out  the  decisions  of  previous
administrations.
Perhaps the problem of momentum  in government  never appeared
more  obvious  or potentially  disastrous  than  at the  Bay  of Pigs.  Ken-
nedy,  under  compulsion  from  the  CIA  and  the  Pentagon  to  permit
the  Cuban  landing  eventually  agreed  against  his  better  judgment
because  the  program,  once  established,  was  carrying  everything  be-
fore  it.  While  Washington  still  debated  the  issue,  Secretary  of  State
Dean Rusk  suggested  that the invasion  begin  at  Guantanamo  so  that
a  base  of  retreat  would  be  available  in  case  of  failure.  Explaining
the  Pentagon's  rejection  of  the  plan  to  one  presidential  aid,  Rusk
noted:  "It  is  interesting  to  observe  the  Pentagon  people.  They  are
perfectly  willing  to  put  the  President's  head  on  the  block,  but  they
recoil  from  the  idea  of  doing  anything  which  might  risk  Guan-
tanamo."
Momentum  more  than  any  other  factor  inhibits  the  infusion
of  new  ideas  and  new  knowledge  into  the  policy-making  process.
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porting  and  analysis  available  to  it  as  the  United  States  Department
of State.  Yet  the  sheer  complexity  and  inertia  of  the  apparatus  make
it  difficult  to  bring  its  accumulated  knowledge  to  bear  on  problems
abroad,  especially  when  such  action  would  require  some  massive
alterations  in  established  policies.  What  baffled  Kennedy,  writes  Ar-
thur  M.  Schlesinger,  Jr.,  was  his  inability  to  obtain  any  useful  ideas
or proposals  from  the  State Department.
The problem  of  intelligence  and  its full  use  by  government,  un-
fortunately,  far  transcends  the  matter  of  bigness  and  confusion.  "A
government  that  has  entered  a  conflict  and  wants  to  pursue  it,"
Myrdal  has  charged,  "will  resort  to  propaganda  and  feel  free  to
twist  the  truth  in  the  direction  of  making  its  policy  seem  the  only
rational  one."  The  more  serious  the  conflict,  the  more  established
policies  assume  an  authoritarian  character.  The  greater  the  stress
the  more  a government  will  insist that  the range  of  alternatives  open
to  it  is  narrower  than  that  available  to  the  adversary.  To  silence  its
detractors,  who  insist  that  choices  exist,  a  government  will often  lay
claim  to  secret  information  which,  it  says,  must  be  preserved  in  the
national  interest.  The  experience  of  recent  history  reveals,  however,
that  no  government  possesses  more  fundamental  and  useful  knowl-
edge  about  another  country  than  is  generally  available  in  the  press
or in literature.
DIPLOMACY  IN  ASIA
United  States  relations  with  China  are  not  simple.  In  Asia  the
status quo  to  which  the  United  States  is  committed  by  its  policies
of  containment  includes  no  provision  for  an  expanding  Chinese
sphere  of  influence.  Indeed,  the  vast  internal  revolution  which  has
given  China both  its  energy  and  its  ambition occurred  only  after  the
United  States  extended  its  Monroe  Doctrine  to  include  Southeast
Asia.  The  challenge  to  American  statesmanship  is  clear,  and  it  dif-
fers  little from  that  posed  by  Japan  during  the  decade  of  the  thirties.
How  and  to what  extent can  this  nation permit  changes  in  the  diplo-
matic,  economic,  and  political  structure  of  Asia?  Can  the  United
States  guide  its  course  in  the  Orient  along  channels  that  will  permit
changes in the status of power without insisting  that some vital Ameri-
can  interest  is  involved  in  every  alteration?  Long  ago  the  United
States  accepted  the  existence  and  even  the  essential  humanity  of
the  British  Empire.  More  reluctantly  it  has  accepted,  but not  recog-
nized  diplomatically,  the  Soviet  sphere  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  great
challenge  remaining  for this  nation  is that  of  permitting,  yet  limiting
to  legitimate  measures,  the  creation  of  a Chinese  sphere  of  influence
in  Asia.
18What  renders  this  problem  so  complex  is  less  the  existence  of
vital  American  interests  in  Asia  than  the  enormous  momentum  in
the  established  United  States  attitudes  toward  China  as  a  repressive,
irresponsible  Asiatic  power.  For  fifteen  years  United  States  behavior
toward  that  nation  has  been  based  on  the  easy  assumption  that
China  is  determined  to  control  all  Asia.  That  China  is  ambitious
is  obvious  enough.  That  China  is  already  the  dominant  force  in
Asian  life  is  equally  clear.  But  influence  and  control  can  take  a
variety  of  forms,  many  highly  acceptable.  The  USSR  established  its
sphere  in Eastern  Europe  through  force;  the  United  States,  on  the
other  hand,  established  its  dominance  in  the  Caribbean  through
trade,  investment,  and  sheer  political  superiority.  China  might  be
encouraged  to  follow  the  example  of  the  United  States,  expanding
her  influence  through  trade,  investment,  and  even  the  exertion  of her
political  primacy,  for nothing  less will permit  that  nation  to establish
a  position  in  Asian  affairs  commensurate  with  her  energy,  size,  and
intrinsic  importance.
In  a  real  sense  the  United  States  does  not  possess  the  choice
to  accept  or  reject  an  enlarged  role  for  China  in  Asian  affairs.  The
real  issue  is  limited  to  the  price  that  this nation  must  pay  to  prevent
it.  The  everlasting  confrontation  of  China  with  policies  of  rejection
and  opposition,  if pursued  into  the  future,  will  extract  its  price  and
that  price  will  be  stupendous.  The  United  States,  fortunately,  is  not
the  only  nation  that  limits  the  power  and  expansiveness  of  China.
Japan,  India,  and  the  Soviet  Union,  as  Asian  powers,  share  that  in-
terest.  It  is  doubtful,  therefore,  that  the  continued  expansion  of
Chinese  influence  in Asia  would  endanger  the security  or well-being
of the American  people.
Lastly,  the  need  to  de-emphasize  the  conflicts  in  Asia  or  Africa
that  fall  under  the  Soviet  category  of  wars  of  revolution  is  dictated
by  the  fact  that  any  United  States  involvement  in  such  a  conflict
creates a confrontation  with Russia  as  well  as China and  compels  the
Kremlin  to  adopt,  often  against  its  own  interest,  an  anti-American
and  pro-Chinese  position.  To  this  extent  conflicts  such  as  those  in
Viet Nam scarcely  serve  the American  interest,  for they endanger  the
profound  gains  of  recent  years  in  the  creation  of  improved  United
States-Soviet  relations.  If  the  earlier  challenge  to  statesmanship  lay
in  Europe,  that  of the  present  and  future  seems  to  lie  in  Asia.  Ken-
nan  has  suggested  that  the United  States  has  placed  itself  in  its  un-
promising  position  in this  increasingly  critical  area  by  attributing  too
much  importance  to  the  turbulent  Asian  nations.  He  said  at  Prince-
ton early  in  1965:
19I  can  think  of  nothing  the  West  needs  more,  at  this  stage,  than
a  readiness  to  relax;  not  to  worry  so  much  about  these  remote  coun-
tries  scattered  across  the  southern  crescent,  to  let  them  go  their  own
way,  not  to regard  their  fate  as  its  exclusive  responsibility,  to  wait  for
them  to  come  look  to  the  West  rather  than  fussing  continually  over
them.  The more  we  exert  ourselves  to  protect  them  from  communism,
the  less  the  exertion  they  are  going  to  undertake  themselves.
The  West  is  not,  after  all,  their  keeper.  They  have  in  general
much  more  to  demand  than  they  have  to  give.  And  others,  even  the
Communists,  are  not  likely  to  derive  much  more  profit  than  the
United  States  or  former mother-countries  have  derived  in  the past  from
the  effort  to  keep  them.
CONCLUSIONS
The  primary  obligation  of  the  United  States  to  serve  its  own
deepest  interests  and  those  of humanity  by  avoiding  any  war  not di-
rectly  or inescapably  in  defense  of  its  own  interests  terminates  at  no
specific  point  in  history.  The  past  successes  of  American  policy  in
bringing  relative  stability  to  the  European  world  especially  can  be
viewed  as  great  achievements  only  as  long  as  they  perpetuate  the
general  conditions  of peace.  Twenty  years  is  but  a short  span of time
in  history,  and  historians  of  the  future  will  credit  this  nation  with
greatness  only  to the  extent  that  it  employs  its wisdom  in  preserving
the achievements  of the centuries.  The judgment of future generations
rides  on  all important  decisions  of government,  even  on  the  decision
to  avoid decisions.  It behooves  those charged  with  the  responsibilities
of  governing  to  think  less  of  the  present  or  the  popularity  of  any
policy  and  to contemplate  rather the relative  ease  or  difficulty  which
others will face in  living with  the  results of  present policies  a genera-
tion or  a century hence.  Few important actions  of government  abroad
can  be  completely  undone;  some  can  never  be  undone.  The  resort
to force  may serve  the American  interest  in  stability;  it may  produce
chaos.  History  is  strewn with  the  wreckage  of  causes  that  seemed  to
triumph.
Undoubtedly  the  path  to  a  future  that  fulfills  the  promise  of
the  past will  be  neither  broad  nor  straight.  Only  for  the  omnipotent
can it  be otherwise.  Those who would  traverse  a  winding  course  suc-
cessfully  must have  the  capacity  to maneuver.  Options  may never  be
easy;  what  is  important  is  that  options  based  on  reality  and  truth
be preserved.  This,  in turn,  requires  above  all  that  the  nation  under-
stand  that  its  area  of  vital  concern,  no  more  than its  power,  encom-
passes  the  entire  globe.  For  a  dozen  years  Adlai  Stevenson  pro-
claimed  the  need  for  greater  balance  between  ends  and  means  in
the  country's  foreign  relations.  His  criterion  for  a  proper  approach
to external  affairs  has  been  repeated  so  often  by  the  nation's  diplo-
20matists  that it  has  become  an  important  element  in  official  rhetoric.
Yet  until policy is  anchored  to  a more pervading  sense  of limits  such
utterances  must  remain  a  body  of  appealing  phraseology  and  little
else.  Whether  embodied  in  policy  or  not,  Stevenson's  precepts,  as
spoken  in  New  York  during  August  1964  establish  a  profoundly
valid,  if  still elusive,  standard  for national  action:
We  have  no alternative  [he  said]  but to  keep  the  balance  between
an  appeasement  which  would  betray  us  by weakness  and  a  brinkman-
ship  which would  destroy  us by  miscalculation.  On this tightrope  above
the  abyss,  we  cannot  indulge  in  adolescent  showmanship  or  Chinese
acrobatics.  We  have,  sanely,  calmly,  to  preserve  our  strength  and  our
caution,  our  full  defensive  might  and  our  ever-readiness  to  negotiate,
our  dedication  to  the  cause  of  allied  freedom  and  our  search  for
reasonable  accommodation.  This  path  is  not  exciting.  It  sets  no
trumpets  braying  or  drums  beating.  It  revolts  the  ideologists.  But  this
adventure  has  in it  the  most precious  of all  possibilities-that  our  chil-
dren  and  our  grandchildren  may  survive  to  build  a  saner,  better,
more  law-abiding  world.
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